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LABOR MARKET INTEGRATION OF MIGRANTS:  
HIDDEN COSTS AND BENEFITS IN TWO-TIER WELFARE STATES 
 








We apply a monopoly trade union model and analyze employment, wage and budgetary 
effects of (i) an inflow of migrant workers and (ii) an increase in the labor market 
participation rate of migrants. Per assumption, natives and migrants solely differ with respect 
to the level of benefit claims in a two-tier welfare system. Furthermore, the labor effects are 
studied under two types of union behavior. Analyzing the ceteris paribus labor market effects, 
we identify hidden costs and benefits of intensified integration that emerge from the design of 
the welfare program. We support previous findings in case of an inflow of migrant workers. 
More interesting, though, it is shown that a larger share of migrants in the workforce increases 
(decreases) the employment level, if the union represents (does not represent) migrant 
workers. 
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The Eastern enlargement in 2004 and 2007 significantly increased the size of the population 
in the European Union. The EU grew from about 400 million by roughly 25% to about 500 
million inhabitants (Eurostat, 2012). Due to the far reaching implications of an EU 
membership regarding cross-national labor mobility, the enlargement also induced a major 
expansion of the labor market. According to the European treaties, citizens of an EU member 
state can take up a job in another member state without a work permit. Furthermore, workers 
are granted full access to the welfare system after a short period of employment in the 
member state. In line with Sjaastad’s human capital approach (1962), these political reforms 
reduce individual migration costs and, thereby, intensify the incentive to migrate.  
Yet migration incentives are not only positively influenced by reduced costs and absolute 
income differentials. A high level of relative poverty in the host country also matters for the 
decision making of potential migrants. For the case of Poland, e.g. Stark, Micevska and 
Mycielski (2009) empirically show that relative poverty measured by the Gini coefficient has 
explanatory power for the high propensity to migrate. Fearing negative consequences of 
enlargement for the labor market, Germany and Austria thus applied temporary restrictions on 
the freedom of movement up to the maximum length of 7 years. However, the 1st of May 
2011 marked the end of the period in which the EU allowed to restrict labor market access for 
EU-10 citizens. On the 1st of January 2014 the latest, restrictions for workers from the EU-2 
(Rumania and Bulgaria) are also to be lifted in every EU-27 country. 
What is a great step towards a unified Europe is at the same time a challenge for national 
policy makers. The opening of borders intensifies the pressure to put in place advanced 
mechanisms of labor market integration since collective bargaining and welfare state 
institutions might hamper the integration of migrant workers. Without controversy, failures in 
the integration process are costly to society as they lead to social exclusion, higher crime rates 
and/or deprivation.1 However, the integration process of migrant workers is multidimensional 
and involves more than the principle of non-discrimination in the European treaties. In our 
paper, we concentrate on two dimensions of integration. The first dimension is the non-
discrimination in national labor market institutions, e.g. in the welfare scheme, as defined in 
the European treaties.2 The second is the integration into employment, e.g. enforced through 
                                                 
1  The harsh living conditions of the Roma minority in many EU countries are just one very apparent 
example. 
2  In earlier debates, it was often argued that, in a common European labor market with mobile workers, 
social standards erode due to the selection principle (see Sinn, 2002). A common argument is that the 
integration process increases the mobility of tax bases and thus results in a decline of governmental 
revenues and a race to the bottom of social standards (see Wildasin, 1995). On the contrary, labor market 
integration can call for more welfare protection if the risk of being unemployed increases. For a 
discussion of social insurance schemes in the integrated Europe, see for instance Andersen (2002, 2003).      
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migrant quotas in a member state.3 Important determinants for the integrative capability of a 
system are the labor market effects of migration induced by (i) the welfare state and (ii) the 
behavior of the market players (trade unions, employers’ associations). Despite their 
relevance, the interaction effects of imperfect labor markets, the welfare system and migration 
were ignored in the literature for a long time.4 
However, in the last decades, a new strand of works has emerged that provides the models 
with more realism by introducing collective bargaining and welfare state provisions. Brecher 
and Choudhri (1987), for instance, model migration into a labor market that is characterized 
by unemployment due to legal wage floors. Consequently, their arguments go along the line 
that migration flows should be minimized in order to avoid immigration into unemployment. 
Analyzing the effects of migration in the presence of a labor union, Schmidt et al. (1994) 
conclude that the substitutability of low- and high-skilled labor is decisive for the question 
whether migration has positive economic consequences or not. A union that represents the 
interests of the whole domestic labor force, i.e. low- and high-skilled workers, decrease 
(increase) the low-skilled wage, if the labor inputs are complements (substitutes). In a 
situation, where the union solely concentrates on the wage and employment of low-skilled 
workers, migration implies a reduction of the nominal wage fostering employment.  
The role of a redistributing welfare state is discussed in Razin and Sadka (1995). The authors 
conclude that the costs of unemployed low-skilled migrants can outweigh the benefits via the 
labor market if migrants cannot be perfectly excluded from participation in welfare programs. 
Kemnitz (2003a) examines the effects of low-skilled migration into a welfare state by 
modeling a PAYG pension system under an imperfect labor market. He argues that, in this 
case, immigration has adverse effects on employment and wages of the native low-skilled. 
Though, those losses are more than compensated by the gains of the high-skilled and the 
pensioners so that the native population clearly profits despite the labor market rigidities. In 
Kemnitz (2003b), the effects of migration under different policy goals, like a constant benefit 
transfer or a constant replacement ratio, are studied. It is shown that the impact of migration 
on native income crucially depends on the skill inflow and the design of the social policy. 
Although our approach is in the spirit of the two lastly cited papers, the frameworks differ in 
central points. While in Kemnitz (2003a) the contribution rate is fixed, in our model, the rate 
adjusts after a parameter change given a fixed level of welfare transfers. Also, the model by 
Kemnitz lacks other important institutional details. First, as usual in the literature, the design 
of the unemployment benefit system is reduced to a unique social transfer. This does not 
                                                 
3  Note that the first type of integration is not determined by national governments since exclusionary 
national legislation is ruled out in the EU treaties, while the second type partly depends on national 
policies like strategies against employer-sided discrimination via minority quotas. 
4  See Berry and Soligo (1969), Rodriguez (1975), Borjas (1995), Meier and Wenig (1997) or Zimmermann 
(1998) who analyze welfare and labor market effects of migration in an institutional setting with perfect 
labor markets. The main finding in such a framework is that migration does not only increase the 
efficiency of allocation, but also affects the distribution of the social product. Generally speaking, 
domestic workers lose and capital owners benefit from an inflow of migrant workers. 
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match e.g. with the situation in the EU where systems with distinct levels of unemployment 
benefits prevail. Second, the literature pays no attention to discriminating behavior of the 
players in the labor market, i.e. of the unions and the employers.5 In our analysis, we fill this 
gap in the literature by implementing a two-tier unemployment benefit system in a right-to-
manage bargaining model with migration. We further consider two types of union behavior. 
In the first scenario, the union embraces the interests of native and migrant workers, while, in 
the second, she exclusively incorporates the interests of the native workers. More precisely, 
our paper analyzes the two labor market integration strategies under differential union 
behavior by studying the following research questions:  
(i) What are the effects of the participation of migrant workers in a two-tier welfare 
system? 
(ii) What are the implications of a change in the participation rate of migrants in the 
workforce, e.g. through the introduction of a governmental quota? 
While the first question focuses on the impact of migration on the contribution rate to the 
unemployment system, the second spotlights the effects of governmental intervention to avoid 
an underrepresentation of migrants in the labor market. The purpose of this paper is to shed 
light on institutional aspects of migrant labor market integration by considering the 
differential effects of a two-tier welfare system and union-sided discrimination in the analysis. 
Independent from union preferences, we support previous findings concerning the negative 
impact of an inflow of migrants on the equilibrium contribution rate. More interestingly, it is 
shown that the effects of a change in the labor market participation rate of migrants are 
qualitatively affected by union behavior. In a two-tier welfare system, a larger share of 
migrants in the workforce decreases (increases) the contribution rate if the union represents 
(does not represent) migrant workers, while this phenomenon is not observable in a welfare 
system with a unique social transfer. We thus detect hidden costs and benefits of labor market 
integration that are induced by the existence of different levels of benefit claims, respectively 
the design of the welfare program.  
We proceed as follows. Section II presents the basic framework. In Section III, we analyze the 
labor market effects of the two dimensions of integration, while hidden costs and benefits of a 
two-tier welfare system are identified in section IV. Finally, we sum up in section V. 
 
 
II. The model 
We apply a model of a small and open economy with migration. It is abstracted from any 
dynamic effects, e.g. migration-induced capital inflows, endogenous skill formation or out-
                                                 
5  In one scenario, Schmidt et al. (1994) assume that only the interests of the natives appear in the union 
function. Due to the modeling of an endogenous native employment quota, migrants thus indirectly affect 
the union calculus. However, by implementing a balanced budget of the social system and analyzing the 
impact of this quota in equilibrium, we widely extend the scope of the analysis.  
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migration of replaced native workers. In spite of its short-term, static nature, we are convinced 
that our simple framework best suits to analyze our research questions. We further suppose 
that a representative firm produces a final good by solely using labor. The technology of 
production is represented by a production function with constant returns to scale 
 
LLFY == )( ,                                                                                           (1) 
   
where L  characterizes the quantity of deployed labor and Y  the output level. We implement 
a decreasing product demand function σ−= Yp , where 10 << σ  denotes the price elasticity.6 
This specification allows the exertion of wage bargaining between the social partners.7 The 
population consists of migrant workers M  and native workers N .8 We suppose that labor, be 
it supplied by natives or migrants, is homogenous and organized in a labor union. Each 
worker inelastically supplies one unit of labor. Concerning the firm-union-relationship, we 
follow the right-to-manage approach. The firm determines the employment level according to 




⋅−⋅= )(max π ,                                                                               (2) 
 
where w denotes the gross wage. With respect to labor compensation, no discrimination takes 
place.9 Given the gross wage claim by the union, the representative firm chooses the number 
of employees. Solving the maximization problem (2) leads to the standard result that 
employment is set where the value of the marginal product equals the gross wage rate. From 
the first-order condition, we obtain as labor demand 
 
                                                 
6  For tractability reasons, we forgo the implementation of demand effects through a migration-induced 
increase in the number of consumers. For an empirical analysis of demand effects, see Bodvarsson, van 
den Berg and Lewer (2008) who study the local demand effects of the famous Mariel boat lift. 
7  An alternative way to allow wage bargaining would be the implementation of a production function with 
decreasing returns to scale and a price normalized to unity. This would capture the idea that the output 
good is the numeraire and that a second, fixed factor such as capital or land is employed. However, in 
case of a production function with constant returns to scale and a normalized price, there is no room for 
wage bargaining since the firm earns zero profits. By using a downward sloping demand function, the 
final good producer faces imperfect competition similar to Dixit and Stiglitz (1977). Thus, our 
specification allows us to keep in mind the potential role of product market competition. Since both 
interpretations ensure that the firm earns positive profits and can be transformed into the same algebraic 
form, the results do not differ.  
8  In line with the literature, we abstract from modeling endogenous migration decisions. Hence, M is 
treated as an exogenous variable and does not depend on the wage level, the unemployment rate, the level 
of benefits or non-economic variables like the stock of migrants or cultural proximity. For an overview of 
the rich literature on determinants of migration decisions, see e.g. Massey et al. (1993) and Zaiceva and 
Zimmermann (2008).  
9  This restrictive assumption can be e.g. justified by laws that forbid the exclusion of workers from labor 
union wages, be they members or not. In Germany, for example, non-members are to be paid the same 
wage as union members in case of a comparable qualification level. Hence, our assumption of 
substitutability is not implausible. 
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which covers natives and migrants. The proportion of the employees having migrant roots is 
denoted by θ . It is thus a measurement of discrimination of migrants in the labor market, as it 
describes the selectivity of the employers with respect to the origin of the worker.10  
Migrant workers are negatively discriminated against by the firm if the proportion of migrant 
relative to native employees is smaller than the proportion of migrants relative to natives in 
the economy’s overall workforce. Hence, if 0=θ  applies, migrants are completely excluded 
from the labor market and are fully negatively discriminated against on their origins. If ( )MNM +=θ  holds, the proportion of employed migrants complies with the proportion of 
migrants in the workforce and no discrimination can be detected. If ( )MNM +>θ  applies, 
positive discrimination in the labor market prevails.11 Here, we assume that the government 
can directly influence the participation rate θ  via legal quotas to pursuit her integration policy 
and to combat the underrepresentation of migrants in the workforce.  
Further, we model a utilitarian utility function to describe the preferences of the labor union. 
The individual utility is linear in net income.12 By introducing parameter γ , we account for 
union-sided discrimination. In case of 0=γ , the trade union represents all workers in the 
economy, be they migrants or natives. In contrast, if 1=γ  holds, only the native workers are 
considered in the trade union’s utility function. As our model describes an imperfect labor 
market, not all potential workers in the economy are employed. 
Describing the design of many European welfare states, we consider a system that consists of 
two tiers, a contribution-based unemployment insurance and a basic income support 
payment.13 Thus, the exogenous unemployment remuneration scheme depends on the working 
history. In our setting, 1b  denotes the classical unemployment benefit which is granted to the 
short-term unemployed. As usual, this payment is conditional on a minimum number of 
contribution years. In contrast, the social assistance 2b  is paid to long-term unemployed, 
independent of the number of contribution years. Furthermore, 21 bb ≥  holds. In contrast to 
reality, in our framework, the proportion of native long-term to short-term unemployed is 
                                                 
10  Here, we limit the analysis of employer-sided discrimination on the hiring practice. Certainly, one could 
think of other sources of employer-sided discrimination like differences in the payment schemes or 
disadvantages in working conditions. 
11  Using data of the IZA Expert Opinion Survey, Kahanec et al. (2011) provide empirical evidence for 
employer-sided discrimination in the European Union. 
12  Of course, the limitation on this specific type of objective function is discussable. The idea behind our 
approach is a labor union which represents the whole supply of risk-neutral workers. As stated by Booth 
(1995), this formulation occurs if the wage setting behavior results in unemployment for union members. 
Since this is an often used specification in the literature, we also follow this approach. 
13  For an overview concerning the system in several OECD countries, see Atkinson and Micklewright 
(1991, p. 1688/1689). In the article, it is pointed out that “the theoretical literature on unemployment 
benefit largely ignores important institutional features of actual social security schemes”. According to 
the authors, one should consider that the “UI (unemployment insurance) benefit is paid for a limited 
duration, and the rate of benefit may decline over time”. An exemption is e.g. Kreiner and Whitta-
Jacobsen (2002) who consider a limited duration of unemployment benefits in a trade union model. 
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modeled as a constant.14 Hence, φ  describes the fraction of native short-term unemployed and 
( )φ−1  the fraction of native long-term unemployed. In order to facilitate interpretation, we 
define 
 ( ) 21 1 bbb ⋅−+⋅= φφ                                                                                          (4) 
 
as the benefit claim of the “average” native unemployed. Due to shorter working biographies, 
migrants are not supposed to concede claims for the benefit level 1b .
15 
Modeling the wage formation, we build on the monopoly union model going back on the 
work of Dunlop (1944).16 Furthermore, we assume that the union is small and does not 
internalize the effects of its wage setting behavior on the government’s tax rate 
determination.17 Hence, the calculus is described by the following maximization problem: 
 
 
( )( ) ( )[ ] ( )[ ] ( )( ) 221 11111max bLMbbLNLwtUw ⋅−−+⋅−+⋅⋅−−+⋅−−= θγφφθθγ       (5) 
 
whereby t  characterizes the contribution rate of the unemployment benefit scheme. The 
contribution respective tax rate is set by the government and levied as a proportional tax on 
the gross wage w . From the first-order condition of the union’s calculus, we obtain as net 
wage rate 
 




⎡ −⋅⋅−+⋅⋅−⋅−=⋅−= −− θθγγθσ 211 11111 .                     (6) 
 
This standard result shows that the wage rate consists of the outside option plus a mark-up. 
The corresponding level of employment is given by 
 
                                                 
14 Keeping the model simple, we ignore the work history by dividing the native workforce exogenously in 
long- and short-term unemployed workers. Empirically, it is shown that the fraction of long-term 
unemployed increases with the level of the overall unemployment rate in the economy. However, in order 
to reduce model complexity, we assume a fixed fraction independent from the level of unemployment. 
15  Obviously, this is a simplifying assumption as many migrants have sufficient working records in the host 
country to claim the higher unemployment benefit. However, on average, it is reasonable to suppose that 
migrants have shorter periods of contribution than natives. This justifies our assumption of lower, average 
claims on the welfare state. 
16  Although the monopoly union characterizes the wage formation process in a highly simplified manner, 
we rely on this special case of the Nash bargaining model. Thus, our setup is not only simple and tractable 
but also delivers results which are qualitatively not different from more complex bargaining modelling 
(see Oswald, 1985). Following Holmlund (1989, p. 20), in this case, “one might invoke Occam’s razor 
and dispense with the more general model as one with excess baggage”. Consequently, we restrict our 
analysis on the special monopoly union case. 
17  This simplification is in line with the literature. See e.g. Schmidt et al. (1994), Fuest and Thum (2000) or 
Kemnitz (2003a, b). 
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.                    (7) 
 
Since our framework allows us to distinguish between a discriminating ( 1=γ ) and a non-
discriminating ( 0=γ ) labor union, we focus on the effects of migrant labor market 
integration under these two extreme cases. 
 
i) non-discriminating trade union, i.e. 0=γ  








⎛ −⋅−⋅−= −= 210 111 θσγ . 
 
The net wage negatively depends on the labor market participation of migrants, i.e. a ceteris 
paribus increase in the participation rate θ  decreases the net wage. The same holds for the 
gross wage claim since, at this stage, the contribution rate is given.18 Explained is this 
counterintuitive result by the fact that fewer natives in the employed workforce increase the 
marginal costs of a higher gross wage. Due to this increasing effect on the union’s marginal 
costs, a larger labor market participation rate of migrants induces a less aggressive wage 
setting. Alternatively, one may argue that more migrants in the employed workforce reduce 
the opportunity costs of the outside option offered by the welfare state. A ceteris paribus 
increase of employment causes smaller costs for the union since the migrant workers only 
loose the amount of the lower unemployment benefit 2b  and not b  by taking up a job. The 
terms of the trade-off of employment level L  and gross wage w  changes in favor of 
employment. Formally, our argument is described in the FOC from equation (5): 
 ( ) ( )[ ] [ ]211 bbLbwtLLt ww −⋅⋅−−⋅−⋅−=⋅− θ . 
 
The LHS of this equation characterizes the union’s marginal revenue of a gross wage 
increase. Each employed worker receives the share of ( )t−1  from a one-unit increase in the 
gross wage. Given that, in the FOC, marginal benefits equal marginal costs, the RHS 
expresses the associated marginal costs of an increase in the gross wage. These costs consist 
of the net income loss of workers with average benefit claim b  that do not find a job due to 
the higher wage level (first term). But in addition, a second term on the RHS is observable. 
This term describes the additional income loss of the migrant workers that become 
unemployed. As their benefit claims are lower, the difference ( )2bb −  multiplied by the 
                                                 
18  Affecting the tax rate, a change in the rate θ  additionally strengthens or weakens this effect via the 
balanced budget. We demonstrate this logic in detail at a later stage. 
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proportion of migrants in the workforce is added to the income loss of the union. The 
equation above thus shows that the utility loss for the non-discriminating union increases in 
the employment participation rate of migrants. This is the underlying reason for a less 
aggressive wage setting as a result of a larger θ . In addition, the wage equation shows that the 
strength of the wage-moderating effect depends on the ratio of b  and 2b . Hence, there is 
room for political decision-making to strengthen or weaken the employees’ income losses. 
 
ii) discriminating trade union, i.e. 1=γ  
If the trade union only represents the native workforce, the net wage reduces to 
 
( ) bw ⋅−= −= 11 1 σγ . 
 
This is the standard result in a monopoly wage setting. In the case of the discriminating trade 
union, the gross wage claim does not react on an increase in θ . Since the trade union does not 
incorporate the interests of the migrants, the outside option of the migrants is irrelevant for the 
maximization. Here too, an alternative interpretation can be given. Under the assumption of a 
constant fraction of native employees, the calculus is reduced to a wage surplus maximization 
for this fraction. To be more precise: even if the fraction of the employed natives decreases, 
there is no change in the marginal costs or revenues of the union. Analogue to case (i), the 
FOC from equation (5) clarifies the argumentation. For a discriminating union, it is given by 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )[ ]bwtLLt w −⋅−⋅⋅θ−−=⋅−⋅θ− 1111 . 
 
Again, the LHS of the equation describes the union’s marginal revenue of a gross wage 
increase by one unit. However, here, the union does not represent migrant workers. So, in 
contrast to (i), the marginal gain applies to the native share of the employed workforce, i.e. ( ) L⋅−θ1 . The RHS characterizes the associated marginal costs of an increased gross wage 
for natives. Since ( ) wL⋅−− θ1  describes the number of additional natives not finding a job, 
the union’s utility loss (RHS) coincides with the income loss of those natives, i.e. the income 
differential ( ) bwt −⋅−1  weighted by the number of unemployed natives. Since the union’s 
calculus is equivalent to a surplus maximization, the share of migrant employees does not 
affect marginal costs. Hence, an increase in the participation rate θ  has no impact on the 
discriminating union’s wage setting behavior. Considering the two types of union behavior, 
we can summarize as 
 
Proposition 1:  
The net wage under a discriminating union is larger than under a non-discriminating 
union. A larger labor market participation rate of migrants increases this wedge as it 
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a) induces a lower net wage if the union represents all workers and 
b) does not affect the net wage if the union only represents the natives. 
 
A special feature of our framework should be noted. Under the extreme assumption that 
migrants are excluded from the labor market ( 0=θ ), the net wages do not differ under the 
two types of trade union behavior. This results from the fact that the scenario is equivalent to 
a wage surplus maximization, where the income of migrants is fixed by the social payment in 
case of a non-discriminating union. The same holds true if the extreme case 2bb =  applies, 
since here the union calculus is also reduced to a maximization of the wage surplus. 
Completing the basic model, we introduce a government that provides the social security 
system. Transfers are financed by a tax rate t  set such that the aggregate contributions to the 
system equal the costs of unemployment benefits. Then, the equilibrium tax rate fulfills 
 ( )[ ] ( ) 21 bLMbLNLwt ⋅⋅−+⋅⋅−−=⋅⋅ θθ .                                                    (8) 
 
Analogue to net wage and employment level, equation (8) collapses to the same term for the 
two types of union behavior under the assumption of 0=θ  or 2bb = .19 Using conditional 
equation (8) as a starting point, we conduct a comparative statics analysis. In doing so, we are 
able to isolate the labor market effects of changes in the integration parameters M  and θ  
under the two types of trade union behavior. 
 
 
III. Labor market effects of integration 
In the following section, we concentrate on the labor market effects of intensified migrant 
worker integration in equilibrium. Sticking to the main research questions, we focus on the 
two dimensions of integration and analyze (i) the effects of an inflow of migrant workers and 
(ii) the implications of a larger labor market participation rate of migrants. We already learned 
that labor market integration affects the gross wage claim of the union. In addition, equation 
(8) states that it also influences the number and distribution of benefit recipients. In the next 
step, we simplify our framework with respect to the trade union type and discuss the ceteris 
paribus labor market effects in detail. 
 
III.1. Integration with a discriminating trade union 
With the simplification 1=γ , gross wage and corresponding employment are 
 
                                                 
19  See the appendix for a version of the budget equation where it is substituted for the wage equation (6) and 
the corresponding employment decision (7). 
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Substituting for both in the governmental budget constraint (8), we obtain the balancing 
contribution rate as 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ⎟⎠
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σ σλσ ,                   (9) 
 




bθλ .  
As stated in our first research question, we are interested in the ceteris paribus consequences 
of an inflow of workers from abroad. Hence, we derive the total differential with respect to 
the stock of migrant workers in the economy and obtain 
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dt .                                           (10) 
 
As the union does not consider the economy-wide labor supply in its decision on the wage 
level, an influx of migrants does neither change the gross wage nor the employment via the 
channel of the optimizing union. However, migration has an effect on employment and wages 
via the budgetary channel. An increase in the number of recipients of benefits increases the 
budgetary costs and has to be countervailed by an increase in the contribution rate. Since λ  
has the value 1 as an upper bound, the denominator is always positive if ( ) t>− σσ 12 .20 
From now on, we assume that this condition is always met. The corresponding effects on the 





























                                                 
20  The definition of this restrictive condition is necessary as the government does not follow an optimal 
taxation strategy by e.g. maximizing the tax revenue. In fact, the tax rate is set such that the budget is 
balanced no matter whether it is Laffer efficient or not. By applying this condition, we make sure that the 
government always chooses a tax rate-revenue combination on the upward sloping side of the Laffer 
curve. Note that for all positive values of the tax rate, this assumption implies the condition 121 <<σ  to 
hold. Thus, per assumption, the wage elasticity of labor demand is not too elastic in our model. 
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For the analysis of our second research question, we can also rely on equation (9). By 
building the total differential with respect to θ  and t , we obtain the ceteris paribus tax effect 



























dt .                                                            (11) 
 
Expression (11) gives us several interesting insights. Firstly, in case of an unemployment 
benefit system with a single compensation level, i.e. 2bb = , the labor market participation 
rate of migrants does not affect the contribution rate. Thus, if natives and migrants do not 
differ with respect to the welfare transfer, an increase in the fraction of employed migrants 
does not affect the equilibrium value of the bargained gross wage. Secondly, in case of a two-
tier welfare system, i.e. 2bb > , a larger workforce participation of migrants increases the 
contribution rate.21 
Our finding can be explained as follows. We know that the labor union does not consider the 
interests of the migrants so that the net wage does not change with an increase in the 
participation rate θ . This is because the discriminating trade union exactly counterbalances 
the change in the tax rate by adjusting the gross wage. An increase in the proportion of 
employed migrants leads to higher costs for the welfare state, since the replaced native 
workers have, on average, higher benefit claims. Due to increasing unemployment 
expenditures, the government has to adapt the tax rate, i.e. the rate increases. Algebraically, 

































As further shown in the tax rate equation (10) and (11), the strength of the effects depends on 
the wedge between 2b  and b . The summarization of our observations leads to 
 
Proposition 2:  
Under the assumption of a discriminating union, it follows that both, an inflow of 
migrant workers and an increase in the labor market participation rate, is 
accompanied by an increase in the contribution rate t . 
 
                                                 
21  As in the argumentation above, this holds at least under a sufficiently inelastic labor demand, i.e. ( ) t>− σσ 12 . 
 13
The budgetary effect of a migrant inflow is well known and shown in earlier studies.22 
However, to our knowledge, we are the first who address the effect of an increase in the 
employment participation rate of migrants in a social security system. Furthermore, our model 
allows us to distinguish the effects under different welfare schemes as shown at a later stage.  
 
III.2.   Integration with a non-discriminating trade union 
Supposed that the trade union incorporates the interests of the native and migrant workforce 
( 0=γ ), the wage rate and the corresponding employment level are given by 
 


















Again, we insert the two expressions into the conditional equation (8) to determine the 
equilibrium contribution rate. This rate is implicitly given by 
 









σ σλσ .             (12) 
 
Analogue to section III.1, we demonstrate the effect of an inflow of migrant workers. Hence, 



































dt .                                            (13) 
 
Compared to the findings in the previous section, an inflow of migrant workers does not have 
qualitatively different effects on the labor market variables. An increase in the number of 
recipients induces a larger contribution rate in equilibrium. Nonetheless, the effects differ in 
size. Accordingly, the same is true if we look at changes of the gross wage and the 




























                                                 
22  See Kemnitz (2003b) or Facchini and Mayda (2009), who conclude that, given a constant benefit policy, 
the contribution rate in an unemployment insurance system increases if immigrants are on average less 
skilled than natives.  
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Now, we differentiate equation (12) with respect to θ  and t  to study our second research 
question under a non-discriminating union regime. As tax effect of a larger participation rate 
of migrant workers in equilibrium, we derive 
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dt .                    (14) 
 
In contrast to section III.1 and, on the first view, counterintuitive, the tax effect of a larger rate 
θ  is negative if 2bb >  holds. This result is driven by two countervailing effects. The first 
working channel is intuitive. As natives claim, on average, higher benefits, the replacement of 
native through migrant workers corresponds with higher costs for the welfare state. This logic 
of negative budgetary repercussions is equivalent to the scenario in III.1 and results, ceteris 
paribus, in an increasing equilibrium tax rate. However, the second working channel via the 
union’s net wage moderation is not so obvious. As stated in Proposition 1, a larger workforce 
participation rate of migrants induces a less aggressive wage setting for a given tax rate and 
thus leads to a reduced net and gross wage. Since the labor demand curve is downward 
sloping with respect to the gross wage, the reduced wage level creates a labor-augmenting 
incentive resulting in additional hiring. In result, fewer workers participate in the welfare 
system so that less expenditure occurs. The contribution rate decreases. 
In our framework, an increased participation rate of migrants has a negative effect on the tax 
rate. Hence, we can conclude that the wage-moderating effect more than offsets the cost of 

































We sum up our findings as 
 
Proposition 3:  
Under the assumption of a non-discriminating union, it follows that  
a) an inflow of migrant workers increases the contribution rate t   
b) an increase in the labor market participation rate of migrants reduces the 
contribution rate t . 
 
In contrast to the case of a discriminating union, the integration strategies now have different 
effects. While the effect of a migrant inflow qualitatively equals the former, a change in the 
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participation rate leads to an opposite effect. This phenomenon is explained by a second 
working channel in the union’s calculus that implies wage moderation and a larger 
employment level. In result, the burden of taxation is borne by a larger number of employed 
workers, which offsets the pressure on the expenditure side. Thus, with respect to the impact 
of a national integration strategy, the union behavior seems to be a decisive variable. In order 
to define a reference case for the analysis of the differential effects in a two-tier system, the 
next section is devoted to the special case where the welfare system is described by a unique 
benefit level. 
 
III.3.   Special case: Effects of integration in a system with a unique benefit level 
In the previous two sections, we have shown the differential effect of trade union behavior on 
the labor market effects of integration if the benefit levels are different, i.e. 21 bb > . Now, we 
focus on the special case where 21 bb =  holds. We define this case as the reference for later 
comparisons, since it is the standard case analyzed in the literature on labor market effects of 
























































Interesting to notice is the fact that, in this special case, the union behavior does not have a 
differential effect on the outcomes. Furthermore, we observe that a change in the labor market 
participation rate of migrants is tax rate neutral while an inflow of migrant workers has an 
increasing effect on the contribution rate. After the discussion of the aggregate effects of 
migrant labor market integration, we disentangle them in the following chapter and isolate the 





                                                 
23  See Schmidt et al. (1994), Kemnitz (2003b), and Razin and Sadka (1995, 2000), for instance. 
 16
IV. Hidden costs and benefits in a two-tier system 
In the last section, we have shown that the interplay of a two-tier welfare system and the 
union behavior has implications for the economic evaluation concerning the labor market 
effects of the integration of migrant workers. Below, we summarize the major effects of the 
two dimensions of labor market integration ( 0>dM  and 0>θd ) in the two-tier system and 
compare them with the special case of a unique benefit level. This allows us to isolate hidden 
costs and benefits that emerge from the design of the welfare system. In doing so, we compare 
the direction and the size of the impact on the contribution rate which defines the effects on 
the labor market outcome. Costs and benefits are defined as changes of the employment level 
since this is a common indicator for successful policy reforms.24 Hence, a parameter change 
induces costs if it has a decreasing effect on the employment level, while it induces benefits if 
it has an increasing effect on the employment level. Costs and benefits are denoted as hidden 
if they do not emerge in the reference case ( 21 bb = ) that prevails in the literature. 
 
IV.1.  Hidden costs and benefits of a larger migrant stock 
 
Table 1 gives an overview of the labor market effects emerging from an increase in the 
migrant stock under the different scenarios. 
 
welfare system trade union behavior change in labor market outcome 
  dt  dw  dL  wd  
two-tier system: 21 bb >  discriminating: 1=γ  + + - 0
 non-discriminating: 0=γ  + + - 0
special case: 21 bb = discriminating: 1=γ + + - 0
 non-discriminating: 0=γ  + + - 0
Table 1: Labor market effects of a change in the migrant stock ( 0>dM ) in different scenarios 
 
In case of a two-tier welfare system, i.e. 21 bb > , an inflow of migrant workers results in an 
increase in the equilibrium contribution rate. Additional workers in the economy induce 
higher welfare expenditures, since the monopoly trade union does not consider the overall 
supply of workers in its calculus. Therefore, an inflow of migrant workers increases the 
number of benefit recipients. Consequently, the equilibrium contribution rate increases and 
the union (be it discriminating or non-discriminating) upwardly adjusts the gross wage claim. 
                                                 
24  One might say that this definition of costs and benefits is too narrow since it does not account for the shift 
of the distribution of the social product via the wage mechanism. However, in our model, a higher 
employment level corresponds with an increase in the economy’s output that gives room for 
compensating redistribution. Accordingly, we argue that an output increase describes a potential Pareto 
improvement in a Kaldor-Hicks sense and is thus beneficial. 
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Furthermore, the employment level is reduced due to the larger gross wage. In contrast, the 
net wage remains unchanged as the trade union sets a gross wage that exactly offsets the 
increase in contribution rate t .  
In the special case where 21 bb =  applies, the effects of an inflow of migrant workers do not 
differ qualitatively from the effects in a two-tier system, because the logic of the labor market 
effects is equivalent. However, if we compare the size of the effects for given union behavior, 
we see that in a welfare program with a unique benefit level the impact of additional transfer 
recipients is larger. Thus, in the case with a unique benefit level, the distortion effect of the 
contribution rate increases. In other words, the two-tier welfare system induces hidden 
benefits in terms of higher employment. Based on this finding, we can formulate  
 
Proposition 4: 
For given union behavior, a two-tier system creates hidden benefits in case of an inflow 
of migrants compared to a system with a unique benefit level. 
 
Our setup also allows an alternative interpretation. Let us assume that the union behavior is 
the changing variable. As pointed out, in a welfare system with a unique transfer, the trade 
union behavior does not imply differential effects on the contribution rate since the effects are 
exactly the same under both trade union regimes (see III.3). In contrast, comparing the 
changes in a two-tier-system, we find that the effects differ in terms of size. Thus, although 
trade union behavior does not change the direction of the effects, it induces hidden benefits or 
costs depending on the parameter constellation in the system.  
 
IV.2.  Hidden costs and benefits of a larger labor market participation rate  
Table 2 summarizes the effects of an increase in the labor market participation rate of migrant 
workers. It contrasts the effects in a two-tier system to the effects in a system with a unique 
benefit level. 
 
welfare system trade union behavior change in labor market outcome 
  dt  dw  dL  wd  
two-tier system: 21 bb >  discriminating: 1=γ  + + - 0
 non-discriminating: 0=γ  - - + -
special case: 21 bb = discriminating: 1=γ 0 0 0 0
 non-discriminating: 0=γ  0 0 0 0
Table 2: Effects of a change in the migrant participation rate ( 0>θd ) in different scenarios 
 
If the unemployment payment system consists of two tiers, the equilibrium tax rate increases 
after a positive change in the participation rate θ  in case of a discriminating union (first row). 
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The replacement of natives that have on average larger benefit claims than migrants induces 
an increase in welfare expenditures. Naturally, these larger expenditures are accommodated 
by an upward adjustment of the contribution rate t . As the labor union exclusively represents 
the native workers, i.e. θ  is not part of the wage function, she does not counterbalance the 
larger contribution rate t  with wage moderation. Rather, the union responds with an increase 
in the gross wage claim leading to a decreasing employment level in equilibrium. Thus, 
compared to a unique transfer system (third row), hidden costs of migrant labor market 
integration in form of job losses emerge in the two-tier system. Further, the net wage does not 
change, since the discriminating union exactly offsets the increase in t  by adjusting the gross 
wage claim. 
In contrast and, at first sight, surprising, the second row shows that a larger employment rate 
of migrants has a decreasing effect on the contribution rate t , if the union also embraces the 
interests of the migrant workers ( 0=γ ). As in the case before, the substitution of native 
workers increases welfare costs which has an increasing effect on t . But here, the 
employment participation rate θ  negatively enters the gross wage function. Hence, an 
increase in the participation rate also results in a more defensive gross wage setting by the 
union. The underlying logic is that the union’s opportunity costs of additional employment 
decrease as the proportion of migrants among the hired workers increases. In other words, the 
outside option set by the welfare system is less attractive for migrant than for native workers, 
so that a change in θ  has an impact on the union’s calculus. In sum, the gross wage claim of 
the union decreases which has a labor-augmenting effect. Compared to a unique transfer 
system (fourth row), an increase in the proportion of migrant workers in the workforce thus 
creates hidden benefits in a two-tier system under the regime of a non-discriminating union. 
However, without compensating measurements, these benefits come along with income losses 
for the workers due to a reduced net wage. Given a two-tier welfare system, the union creates 
hidden benefits in terms of higher employment if she behaves non-discriminating. 
In case of a system with a unique level of benefits (third and fourth row), an increase in the 
labor market participation rate of migrants is tax rate neutral and the labor market outcomes in 
equilibrium do not change. The reason is that natives and migrants have the same claims in 
the welfare system so that a substitution of workers has no effect on the benefit costs. 
Consequently, no labor market effects emerge from the different union behavior under a 
unique welfare payment structure. In summary, we find the interesting result that, depending 
on the union behavior, a two-tier system induces hidden costs or benefits which stands in 
contrast to the implications of Section IV.1. We summarize our main findings as 
 
Proposition 5: 
Compared to a system with a unique benefit level, a larger labor market participation 
rate of migrants induces 
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  (a) hidden benefits under the assumption of a non-discriminating union and  
(b) hidden costs under the assumption of a discriminating union 
 in a two-tier system. 
 
Comparing the results of the two subsections gives us several insights with respect to the 
impact of labor market integration. Firstly, the design of the welfare system has no qualitative 
effects in case of integration understood as the participation of additional workers in the social 
security system. However, in a two-tier-system, there are hidden benefits due to a reduction in 
the migration-induced change of the contribution rate. In contrast, we show that for given 
union behavior, the design of the welfare state makes a difference in case of integration 
understood as an increase in the labor market participation rate of migrants. We observe 
qualitative changes of the integration effects depending on the welfare design. Additionally, 
we demonstrate that in a two-tier welfare state, the union behavior creates cost or benefits. 
Since the existent literature often simplifies the welfare modeling or ignores different union 




The freedom of movement and the non-discrimination of EU citizens in the welfare system 
reduce individual migration costs and intensify ceteris paribus the incentives to migrate in the 
EU-27. According to theory, these incentives should result in increasing migration flows to 
attractive host countries. For national policy makers, this poses a challenge since problems 
with efficiency-distorting collective bargaining agreements and/or welfare system structures 
aggravate in a common European labor market with open borders. Arguably, the EU 
legislation increases the pressure to design integration-friendly labor markets. The integrative 
capability of a local labor market can be analyzed with respect to two dimensions: (i) the 
ability to integrate an inflow of migrant workers and (ii) the ability to bring migrant workers 
that already live in the country into employment. 
In general, the economic literature extensively discusses the labor market effects of migration. 
However, the applied models are very stylized in nature and often do not reflect the 
institutional design of the welfare system or the trade union behavior. We contribute to the 
literature by introducing two institutional features that have been neglected in the analysis. 
Firstly, we consider a two-tier unemployment benefit system that is an essential element of 
many EU welfare states. Secondly, we consider discrimination of migrant workers by the 
players in the wage bargaining process, i.e. the trade unions and the employers. Considering 
two dimensions of an integrative labor market, we formulate the following research questions: 
What are the labor market effects of (i) an inflow of migrant workers and (ii) an increase in 
the labor market participation rate of migrants, e.g. after the introduction of a governmental 
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quota? Applying a simple monopoly trade union model, we study the effects on wage, 
employment and tax level in equilibrium and find interesting new insights. 
We show that, in a two-tier welfare system with a non-discriminating union, an inflow of 
migrant workers increases the contribution rate to the unemployment system and reduces the 
employment level. Furthermore, the gross wage increases while the net wage remains 
constant. In sharp contrast, an increase in the labor market participation rate of migrants leads 
to a lower gross and net wage, a reduction in the contribution rate and an increase in the 
employment level. In case of a discriminating union, an inflow of migrant workers results in 
an increase in the contribution rate and a decrease in the employment level. The net wage is 
unchanged while the gross wage increases. Under this regime, a larger participation rate of 
migrant workers has an increasing effect on the contribution rate and a decreasing effect on 
the employment in equilibrium. It induces an increase in the gross wage and a constancy of 
the net wage. 
Comparing the general setup with a system characterized by a unique benefit level, we 
identify hidden costs and benefits of integration in the two-tier system. The size of the 
negative effect of an inflow of migrant workers on the employment level is reduced through 
the positive wedge between 1b  and 2b . Thus, hidden benefits of a two-tier system emerge. 
More interesting though, we show that in case of a unique benefit level, an increase in the 
participation rate of migrant workers is employment neutral while it increases employment in 
case of a non-discriminating union and decreases employment in case of a discriminating 
union in a two-tier system. Trade union behavior qualitatively influences the labor market 
effects of integration. A non-discriminating behavior in a two-tier system creates hidden 
benefits while a discriminating behavior induces hidden costs.   
An important issue should be noted. Our results are based on a static framework. In a dynamic 
model, migrants will - if they work for a minimum number of contributing years - be entitled 
to the higher unemployment benefit. Thus, our model is a short-run analysis and a first step to 
evaluate the impact of migration in a two-tier welfare system. Consequently, further research 
should focus on the convergence of migrants’ work histories. Additionally, different skill 
types in the host country as well as in the migrant inflow and endogenous human capital 
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Substituting for the gross wage equation (6) and the corresponding employment level (7) in 
the budget equation (8), we obtain: 
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